



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Bourbons, the errors of whose government he clearly appreciated and repeatedly attempted to correct, always without avail. Upon the revolution of 1820-21, of which he cordially disapproved, he bears important but not always unbiased testimony; his picture of the deplorable disorganization and insubordination of the Neapolitan army of defense, in which he commanded one of the four corps, is the most graphic and important that has been drawn, while the documents given relative to his own dismissal from the army at the restoration of Ferdinando I. in 1821 are of the first importance as evidence upon Bourbon methods of government. Of the government of Ferdinando II. at his accession and of the conditions of the country at that time he gives an impartial account of great interest. In the chapters relative to his own suppression of the Sicilian revolution in 1848-1849, his subsequent government of the island as lieutenant down to 1855, and the diplomatic and political confusion in Naples in 1859, in the midst of which, as president of the council of ministers, he strove honestly to sustain the tottering monarchy, Filangieri, although writing with considerable personal bias, reveals new facts which rectify many erroneous judgments. As evidence upon the incompetence of Bourbon statesmanship and the inadequacy of its antiquated system of government to satisfy modern requirements, these later chapters furnish irrefutable proof of logical development in the events of southern Italy in 1860, and explain clearly how it was possible for Garibaldi with one thousand men to overthrow a kingdom of twelve million inhabitants, which counted one hundred and twenty-six years of national existence.

The portion of the volume that la Ravaschieri herself wrote is marred by an excessive display of filial sentimentality and, being made up largely of eulogy and apology, leaves much to be desired in critical judgment.

HARRY NELSON GAY.

Die Ermordung Pauls und die Thronbesteigung Nikolaus I. Von THEODOR SCHIEMANN. (Berlin: Georg Reimer. 1902. Pp. xxiv, 420.)

As there are a good many subjects in modern Russian history that cannot be freely discussed in the country where the events themselves took place, we often have to fall back on foreign sources for supplementary information. Thus in recent years there have appeared several works about the unfortunate emperor Paul I. The anonymous *Kaiser Pauls I Ende*, 1801 (R. R. Stuttgart, 1897), gives us a detailed account of the conspiracy that led to the catastrophe, while Schilder in his fine biography of Paul (1900, in Russian) had to content himself with describing the circumstances anterior to an event about which he could only hint. Fresh light was thrown on it in 1901 by Professor Schiemann, of Berlin, who published in the *Historische Vierteljahrsschrift* a letter of Bennigsen, one of the chief actors in the tragedy; and the same writer has now brought out a number of other original authorities here printed for the first time, though some of them were used by Bernhardi in an essay written

in 1860. There are eight papers in the collection, perhaps the most interesting of them being the letter of the young Princess de Lieven and the later commentaries of Prince Eugene of Württemberg. On the whole we find nothing startlingly new, but a number of previously doubtful points are made clearer. We may accordingly affirm with confidence the following facts: (1) There were two conspiracies against Paul. The first one was worked up by Panin, Lord Whitworth, and General Ribas. It was proposed to deprive the Emperor of power on the ground of insanity, and to put in as regent his son Alexander. This plan came to nothing, owing to the break with England and the withdrawal of Whitworth, the death of Ribas, and the banishment of Panin to Moscow. In the second conspiracy Pahlen was throughout the prime mover, but his keeping away from the scene of the actual murder, where Bennigsen and Zubov were the principal actors, led his accomplices to believe that he was prepared to turn against them in case of failure. (2) Alexander was cognizant of the progress of both schemes. His hesitation in ratifying them may have been partly due to some dark feeling at bottom that the revolution could hardly take place without a tragedy. Still, there is no reason to doubt his surprise and horror when the news of his father's death was brought to him. (3) There is, on the other hand, every reason to think that the active conspirators foresaw the inevitable outcome from the beginning. Paul would have been far too dangerous as a captive; and that he must be put to death was taken for granted, though we have no knowledge that it was discussed. (4) The widowed empress Maria Fedorovna dreamed for a moment of ascending the throne herself, but soon was forced to see that she had no partizans. (5) However much one may condemn the character and actions of Pahlen, Bennigsen, the Zubovs, and others, it cannot be denied that the situation in St. Petersburg had become absolutely intolerable. Paul's despotism and caprice had passed the verge of insanity. No one was secure against the Emperor's next whim or fit of anger, and the welfare of the empire as well as the security of the imperial family demanded immediate action. The evidence is overwhelming of the unspeakable relief felt by high and low after the tragedy was completed.

Professor Schiemann's second subject is the curious interregnum that occurred after the death of Alexander I., when grand dukes Nicholas and Constantine were urging each other to accept the imperial crown. He publishes a number of letters that passed between the two princes, and also several descriptions of the military revolt of December 14, 1825, in St. Petersburg. In the latter, one gets a vivid impression of the utter confusion of the whole affair, and the helplessness of the liberal conspirators to do anything with the soldiers after they had once persuaded them to mutiny. As for the contest of generosity between the brothers, Professor Schiemann in his introduction lays stress on the fact that Nicholas, as is proved by recent publications, knew of Constantine's renunciation of the throne, expected it to be maintained, and only proclaimed him under pressure from Miloradovich, who as commander of the guard controlled

the situation ; hence the display of generosity was only high comedy. This conclusion is hardly fair. Granting the premises, we may still admit that Nicholas, who had a high sense of honor, believed it to be his duty to let Constantine, as the older brother and the natural successor of Alexander, decide once more unhampered whether he really wished to give up his claims. The letters between the two, in spite of their formal phraseology, have a genuine ring to them.

In both sets of publications such of the documents as were in Russian are printed in German translations, the originals being added in an appendix.

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE.

La Hongrie Moderne de 1849 à 1901. Étude Historique. Par A. DE BERTHA. (Paris : Plon-Nourrit et Cie. 1901. Pp. iv, 358.)

In these ultra-national days, when writing in any language but one's own is regarded as unpatriotic, we are in danger of getting our ideas about many of the smaller countries of the world almost entirely from foreign, not to say hostile, sources. For instance, as most of us cannot be expected to study the native tongues of Poland, Bohemia, and, still more, of Hungary, for information about these lands we fall back perforce on what we can find in German, regardless of the fact that it is almost impossible for Germans to be quite impartial in their treatment of the history and, still more, of the present politics of peoples whose aspirations have so often conflicted with their own. We are always ready, therefore, to welcome a serious work by a native writer who has condescended to appeal to the Western public in a medium we can understand. Mr. de Bertha's book accordingly deserves a good reception, for it covers a period in the history of his country full of interest even to foreigners. His familiarity with his subject is obvious, his style is clear, and his appreciations in the essentials studiously moderate, though his tone is highly patriotic and his description of Hungarian public men is almost without exception laudatory, not to say fulsome. His account of the negotiations that led to the *Ausgleich* and particularly of the part played by Deák is especially good.

On the other hand, there is a great deal that he does not give us. His work does not at all justify its title, for it is a parliamentary history and little else, although encumbered with lengthy extracts from the regulation speeches at the millennial festivities. He has furnished us with a useful record of debate and legislation and, to a certain extent, of public needs and opinion. He has not described, except in rather vague allusions, the remarkable economic progress of Hungary in recent years, and he has left out all the shadows of the present picture. Brilliant as has been the success that the Hungarians have achieved in the last half-century and respectable as is their position in the world to-day, it is far from true that “tout est pour le mieux dans la meilleure des Hongries possibles.”

To begin with, the *Ausgleich*, the much-lauded achievement of Deák, is working increasingly badly. The Austrians, whether German or Slav,